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et al.: Laird v. Tatum: The Supreme Court and a First Amendment Challenge

LAIRD V. TATUM: THE SUPREME COURT
AND A FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE
TO MILITARY SURVEILLANCE OF
LAWFUL CIVILIAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY*
The First Amendment was adopted to elevate and defend the
central right of a free people: the right to peaceably dissent, to argue,
to persuade, and to demonstrate. The United States Army was
created to preserve and protect our society. Laird v. Tatum,' a class
action challenge to military surveillance of civilian politics, demonstrates with frightening precision the degree to which the force of
protection can and has imperiled the instrument of freedom.
There was no evidence in the record before the Supreme Court
to show the extent to which lawful political activity was chilled and
deterred by Army intelligence. The reasons are several. The action
was initiated with a modicum of information; much that is known

today was not known at the time of the District Court hearing. More
important, individuals present in court who were prepared to relate
their experiences monitoring civilian activity were not allowed to
take the stand and, instead, took their story to the country through
a press conference.
This Comment will explore the salient issues raised by Laird v.
Tatum and will attempt to answer the following questions: Did the
Supreme Court err in denying the political activists an opportunity
to present witnesses at a District Court hearing and in deciding
the issues on the original papers and appellate briefs? Was the Military Intelligence (hereinafter MI) program complained of an impermissible abridgment of First Amendment rights? Did Justice
Rehnquist behave improperly by participating in the Laird v.
Tatum decision? Last, to what extent has the Supreme Court's decision in this case affected future adjudication of First Amendment
class action challenges to government programs of surveillance and
data compilation related to lawful political activity?2
* The author gratefully acknowledges the support and advice of his friend and
colleague, Christopher H. Pyle, Esq. The comments, criticisms and constant intellectual
stimulation of Professor Burton C. Agata were invaluable.
1. 408 US. 1 (1972).
2. The author served in the U.S. Army in Military Intelligence from October
1965 to October 1968. From July 1967 to October 1968, he was assigned to the Counterintelligence Analysis Branch, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
United States Army, Washington, D.C. In that capacity he was the desk, or action,
officer responsible for Left Wing/Anti-War and Civil Disturbance Analysis. Inevitably
the analysis and conclusions in this comment are to a certain degree based on his
experiences and perceptions stemming from that tour of duty. For the author's account
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In January 1970, The Washington Monthly, a social and political science magazine, published "CONUS Intelligence: The Army
Watches Civilian Politics," by Christopher H. Pyle, a lawyer and
former captain in MI. Pyle stated that "[t]he U.S. Army has been
closely watching civilian political activity within the United States.
Nearly 1,000 plainclothes investigators . .. keep track of political
protests of all kinds-from Klan rallies in North Carolina to anti-war
speeches at Harvard."3 In his article, Pyle reproduced a portion of
an MI intelligence summary which described a number of political
activities and named participants and organizations. 4
The reaction to Pyle's article was immediate. While newspaper
reporters investigated Pyle's allegations, senators and congressmen
queried appropriate officials in the Department of Defense and the
Department of the Army to determine whether the military, as Pyle
claimed, actually maintained "files on the membership, ideology,
programs, and practices of virtually every activist political group in
the country"'5 and conducted a program of surveillance.
A number of the persons and organizations mentioned in the
MI summary reproduced in Pyle's article, together with other political activist individuals and groups, engaged the American Civil
Liberties Union to initiate a class action challenge to the constitutionality of the Army's domestic intelligence program.
The action commenced by the activists, Laird v. Tatum, was dismissed by the Supreme Court after two and a half years of litigation
on October 10, 1972.
The case raised a number of still unsettled and pressing constitutional issues, as well as questions concerning Mr. Justice Rehnquist's judicial propriety in participating in the Laird v. Tatum
decision, the latter of a critical importance since the Associate Justice's vote decided the case against the plaintiffs.
I. HiSTORY OF THE CASE
The Laird v. Tatum plaintiffs6 filed their complaint in the
of his experience in military intelligence see Stein, The Expansion of Counter Intelligence, in UNCLE SAM is WATCING You (1971). See also WHrsLE BLOWNG 126-134
(R. Nader, P. Petkas, K. Blackwell, eds. 1972).
3. Pyle, CONUS Intelligence; The Army Watches Civilian' Politics, I THE WAsHWNTON MONTHLY, (Jan. 1970).
4. Id. at 5-6.

5. Id. at 5.
6. The individual plaintiffs were: Arlo Tatum, Executive Secretary of the Central
Committee for Conscientious Obejctors; Conrad Lynn, a private attorney; Benjamin N.
Wyatt, Jr., also a private attorney; and the Reverend Albert B. Cleage, Jr., Minister
of the Shrine of the Black Madonna in Detroit, Michigan. Organizational plaintif
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United States District Court for the District of Columbia on February 17, 1970. 7 They named as defendants in their suit for injunctive and declaratory relief Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and
several high-ranking Army officials."
The complaint, based almost exclusively on the Pyle article, 9 alleged that the MI program created an impermissable First Amendment chill, was ultra vires and exceeded the lawful needs of the
United States Army in carrying out its constitutional and statutory
role with regard to intervention in civil disorders. 10 The litigants
sought a declaration that the Army's activity was unconstitutional
and prayed for a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining
the Army from engaging in the surveillance and data-compilation
activities disclosed by Pyle."' Also sought in the same motion were
a permanent injunction forbidding the defendants from applying
security classifications to reports of civilian political activity and a
mandatory injunction directing the defendants to produce for the
court, but explicitly not for public disclosure, all documents and
files pertaining to military surveillance of civilian politics.' 2 A separate motion for a temporary restraining order was denied.' 8
In a memorandum prior to oral argument before the District
Court, the plaintiffs alleged that "the Army's domestic intelligence
program also involves the conduct of undercover operations by military agents within the civilian community... ."14 This allegation, as
were: Women Strike for Peace; Chicago Area Women for Peace; the Vietnam Week
Committee of the University of Pennsylvania; The Vietnam Education Group of
Knoxville, Kentucky; Veterans for Peace in Vietnam; The American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees; the Vietnam Moratorium Committee; Clergy
and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam; and the War Resisters League.
7. Tatum v. Laird, Civil No. 459-70 (D.D.C., 1970).
8. The other defendants were: Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor; General
William C. Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff; and Brigadier General William H.
Blakefield, Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Command. None
of them currently hold the above positions. The defendants were sued individually
and in their official capacity.
9. From the date of publication of Pyle's article to the time of filing of the complaint in Laird v. Tatum no further information had come to the attention of plain.
tiffs' counsel. Shortly after the complaint was filed, several individuals with personal
and extensive knowledge of the Army's activity came forward, including the author.
Pyle, an instructor at the US. Army Intelligence School at Fort Holabird, Baltimore,
Maryland, had never been personally involved in the activity complained of, but he
had picked up enough information from friends and acquaintances to write the
January 1970 article.
10. Complaint of Tatum et al., supra note 7.
11. Id. at 2.
12. Id. at 10.
13. Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Tatum v. Laird, Civil No.
459-70 (D.D.C., fied Mar. 12, 1970, denied Mar. 13, 1970).
14. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Support of Their Motion for a Preliminary Injunc.
tion and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 1.
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will be discussed later, is of seminal significance in analyzing Laird
v. Tatum.
Responding to the plaintiff's assertions in the several pre-hearing
motion papers, the defendants stated that the Army's preparation
for its civil disturbance mission necessitated that information be collected before a crisis, and that such collection was reasonable and
implied by statutes which authorize the Army's civil disturbance
function.'5 The defendants would not discuss the specific activities
of the MI branch, but urged that the Army's conduct was constitutional and claimed that the Laird v. Tatum activists had failed to
state grounds upon which relief could be granted. An affidavit filed
by Under Secretary of the Army Thaddeus R. Beal did admit, however, that "As a result of a review of the intelligence activities of the
U.S. Army it has been determined that certain records maintained
by the Army were not useful and were not necessary in view of the
Army's mission."' 16 The Beal affidavit did not elaborate on the nature
or scope of MI holdings concerning civilians.
On April 22, 1970, oral argument on the motion papers was
heard in the District Court by Judge George L. Hart, Jr. Present
in the courtroom were a number of former MI agents who were prepared to testify on behalf of the plaintiffs as to the extent and nature
of MI operations; 17 three of these former agents were willing to discuss covert and clandestine infiltration operations conducted by MI
personnel. 8
Judge Hart refused to allow plaintiffs' counsel, Professor Frank
Askin of Rutgers University School of Law, and Melvin L. Wulf,
National Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, to
present any witnesses. He insisted instead that oral argument was
sufficient. Ignoring the claim of Professor Askin that the witnesses
present in court were able to testify as to the existence of covert operations, Judge Hart concluded that MI activity seemed to be limited to the clipping of news media reports. Such activity, he
maintained, whether engaged in by the Army or by the press, is
15. Defendant's Memorandum In Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction at 3-7.
16. Affidavit of Thaddeus R. Beal.
17. The author and two former agents were present in the courtroom and prepared to testify. Unfortunately, counsel for plaintiffs had not secured affidavits from
the persons prepared to testify. As a result, Judge Hart, after refusing to hear witnesses,
had no means of learning that serious charges of clandestine operations by the Army
were being advanced by the litigants.
18. Much of the material which the former agents were prepared to discuss during
testimony was publicly revealed for the first time in a press conference immediately
after the District Court hearing. See NEsvWana, May 4, 1970, at 35-36.
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equally constitutional. Hart, in dismissing the action, 10 found that
no unconstitutional action by the Army was shown and that the
complainants had not alleged any unlawful conduct.20 On April 23,
1970 an appeal was filed. On April 27, 1971, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia remanded the case to the District Court
for an evidentiary hearing.21 Judge Wilkey, for the majority, found, 22
Because the evil alleged in the Army intelligence system is
that of overbreadth ... and because there is no indication
that a better opportunity will later arise to test the constitutionality of the Army's action, the issue can be considered justiciable at this time.
He acknowledged that the military has a legitimate need for certain information in order to effectively intervene in civil disorders.
He noted also that "The questions are what type of information the
military needs, how they should go about obtaining it, when they
need it, and whether what the Army has done here has infringed
'23
any of appellants' rights.
Whatever the Army had "done here" was limited, in the view
of the court majority after examining the District Court record, to
what "a good newspaper reporter would be able to gather by attendance at public meetings and the clipping of articles from publications available on any newsstand. ' 24 Since the testimony of witnesses
was absent, the court concluded that "[t]here is no evidence of illegal
or unlawful surveillance activities. We are not cited to any clandes'25
tine intrusion by a military agent.
The court recognized, however, that "[t]he compilation of data
by a civilian investigative agency is thus not the threat to civil liberties or the deterrent on the exercise of the constitutional right of
free speech that such action by the military is. ....,2l The court ordered the case re-heard by the District Court to determine four
27
principal issues:
1. The nature of the Army domestic intelligence system made
the subject of appellants' complaint, specifically the extent of
19. Oral dismissal on April 22, 1970.
20. Order of Dismissal, April 29, 1970.
21. 444 F.2d 947, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
22. Id. at 955-6.
23. Id. at 955.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 957.
27. Id. at 959.
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the system, the methods of gathering the information, its
content and substance, the methods of retention and distribution, and the recipients of the information.
2. What part, if any, of the Army domestic intelligence gathering system is unrelated to or not reasonably necessary to the
performance of the mission as defined by the Constitution,
statutes, military regulations, and as interpreted by actions
under those written definitions of the mission.
3. Whether the existence of any overbroad aspects of the intelligence gathering system, as determined above, has or might
have an inhibiting effect on appellants or others similarly
situated.
4. Such relief as called for in accordance with the above established law and facts.
Judge MacKinnon dissented, finding that "the chill to this amorphous group... is grounded in the unrealistic and speculative fear
that the Government will improperly use the information against
them." 28 He asserted that the appellants lacked standing based on
the admission of counsel during oral argument before Judge Hart
that the plaintiffs were not cowed or chilled, but rather wished to
represent those Americans who were supposedly so affected by the
Army program.

29

The Supreme Court granted defendants' petition for certiorari
on the issues of justiciability and standing.8 0 The government, in
their briefs and before the Court, argued that the case lacked concreteness and evidence of a real injury to the rights of the plaintiffs.81
The defendants also asserted that the issue was moot.3 2 Sufficient

public disclosure of clandestine MI activities by a large number of
former military personnel had forced some admissions of inappropriate activity by Army officials followed by assurances that such activity had been halted. The defendants offered the Army's assurances
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 2, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). The
Court's jurisdiction was invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
31. Id. at 2, 13-14, 32-33.
32. Id. passim. In briefs and on oral argument before the Supreme Court, the
government argued that such activities as had been determined by the Army to be
unnecessary had been stopped and that there was no further cause for complaint. The
defendants were hampered to a certain degree by a continuing series of revelations
by former Army personnel, some of which were in direct conflict with the assurances
and statements of Army officials. While these developments were not, of course, before
the Court, they were a matter of considerable public, legislative and news media
interest.
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to show that the issue was moot; they also alleged that the responsibility for insuring the lawful functioning of MI operations resided
8
in the Executive and Legislative branches. 8
The plaintiffs urged the Supreme Court to affirm the Court of
Appeals order for an evidentiary hearing.84 Arguing that the record
was insufficient for a valid determination of the constitutional
issues,"5 the plaintiffs alleged that many of the defendants' assertions
of fact about First Amendment injury were, in reality, contested and
could not be decided absent an opportunity to present witnesses
and documentary evidence.8 6
Prior to oral argument, an unusual brief amici curiae was submitted to the Court. The amici, twenty-nine former MI officers and
enlisted personnel, urged the Court to allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to present witnesses and evidence in the trial court.3

7

They

informed the Court that far from limiting its activities to clipping
newspapers, MI, among other things, infiltrated agents into Resurrection City,"8 had agents pose as newsmen with bogus identification
cards to obtain information from unsuspecting civilians during protests,8 9 had infiltrated the headquarters of the National Mobilization
33. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 50, at 33. The government had raised the separation of powers question at the District Court and the Court of Appeals level. The
government urged the Court to accept the viewpoint that where a party seeking to
represent a class similiarly situated failed to allege a specific personal injury the
case lacked the clarity and focus required to maintain a case or controversy and was,

in reality, a political question which the Legislative and Executive Branches were
especially designated, under the Constitution, to decide.
84. Respondents' Brief in Opposition, at 80, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
35. Id. at 15.
36. Id. at 9.
37. For Tatum, et aL., as Amid Curiae, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). Christopher H. Pyle and the author participated in the writing of the Brief. Counsel for
the amici were Professor Burke Marshall, Deputy Dean of the Yale Law School, and
Professor Arthur R. Miller, Harvard Law School. It is the author's belief that this
Brief is unique in that, for the first time, individuals with a common background but
no organizational link with one another were brought together for the sole purpose
of submitting an amici brief to the Supreme Court. The expenses incurred in this
undertaking were shared by most of the amici.
88. Id. at 17. Resurrection City was the Washington, D.C. tent encampment of the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference's Poor Peoples' Campaign. It was located
between the Washington Monument and the Lincoln Memorial. The author, on duty
in the Pentagon, received daily reports from, among others, an Army major, a black
officer who infiltrated Resurrection City after assuming a false identity and with
specific orders to attempt to influence Southern Christian Leadership Conference
policy. A large number of other agents, who reported regularly, roamed the area in
casual clothing with orders to glean as much information as possible from participants
in the Poor People's Campaign.
89. Id. Agents with phony press cards and portable videotape units were ordered to
conduct interviews with civilians during protests in the hope that those interviewed
would divulge future plans.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1973

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 16

Comments
Committee to End the War in Vietnam, 40 had penetrated the Colorado Springs Young Adults Project, 4' and had assigned agents to
stake-out Martin Luther King's grave to determine who came to
42
the graveside.
On June 26, 1972, Chief Justice Burger delivered the majority
opinion in a 5 to 4 reversal of the Court of Appeals decision, thereby
affirming the dismissal of the action.4 3 The Court acknowledged the
"traditional and strong resistance of Americans to any military intrusion into civilian affairs," 44 but found that there had been no
actual or threatened injury by reason of unlawful activities by the
Military.
45
The Court noted,
The [Army's] information itself was collected by a variety
of means, but it is significant that the principal sources of information were the news media and publications in general
circulation.
The Court majority, agreeing with the government's position,
contended,46
The system put into operation as a result of the Army's
1967 experience consisted essentially of the collection of information about public activities that were thought to have
at least some potential for civil disorder...
Of far greater import, however, was the Court's acceptance of the
defendants' claim that Laird v. Tatum was nonjusticiable because
the parties bringing the action had failed to show injury and thus
lacked standing to sue. In the absence of injury, the issues raised
required action by the Executive and Legislative branches if they
perceived a need to respond to the allegations raised by the plaintiffs'
47
The Court majority stated,
[T]hey [plaintiffs] disagree with the judgments made by the
Executive Branch with respect to the type and amount of
40. Id.
41. Id. at 17-18.
42. Id. at 17.
43. 408 U.S. 1 (1972). Joining the Chief Justice were Associate Justices White,
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist.
44. Id. at 15.
45. Id. at 6.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 13.
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information the Army needs and that the very existence of the
Army's data-gathering system produces a constitutionally impermissible chilling effect upon the exercise of their First
Amendment rights.
The political activists, in the opinion of the Court, sought a wide,
self-conducted investigation of Army intelligence operations, utilizing the Federal judiciary as its agency of inquisition. 8
Carried to its logical end, this approach would have the
federal courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom
and soundness of Executive action; such a role is appropriate
for the Congress acting through its committees and the "power
of the purse"; it is not the role of the judiciary, absent actual
present or immediately threatened injury resulting from unlawful governmental action.49 [emphasis added]
The Court therefore concluded that the respondents lacked standing to bring the action. Mr. Justice Douglas, in a dissent in which
Mr. Justice Marshall concurred, began by asserting that "Our tradition reflects a desire for civilian supremacy and subordination of
military power." 50 Reviewing the role of the military, the Justice
stated8 1
[T]he Armed Services . . . are not regulatory agencies or
bureaus that may be created as Congress desires and granted
such powers that seem necessary and proper. The authority to
provide rules "governing" the Armed Services means the
grant of authority to the Armed Services to govern themselves, not the authority to govern civilians.
He continued, "The action in turning the 'armies' loose on surveil'2
lance of civilians was a gross repudiation of our traditions.
Justice Douglas found that the majority's conclusion that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue was "too transparent for serious
argument."8 3 Noting that the Army allegedly maintains files on all
groups engaged in activist politics,3 "uses undercover agents to infiltrate these civilian groups.. ."55 and "moves as a secret group among
48. Id. at 14.
49. Id. at 15.

50. Id. at 19.
51. Id. at 18.

52. Id. at 23.
53. Id. at 24.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 25.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1973

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 16

Comments
civilian audiences, using cameras and an electronic ear for surveillance," 56 he concluded that, "One need not wait to sue until he loses
his job or until his reputation is defamed. To withhold standing to
sue until that time arrives would, in practical effect, immunize from
judicial scrutiny all surveillance activities, regardless of their misuse
57
and their deterrent effect."
Mr. Justice Brennan, in a separate dissent concurred in by Associate Justices Stewart and Marshall, decried the denial to the plaintiffs of an opportunity to present evidence at the trial court level.
Justice Brennan stated, s
Respondents may or may not be able to prove the case
they allege. But I agree with the Court of Appeals that they
are entitled to try.
Following the Supreme Court's June decision, the plaintiffs filed
a petition for re-hearing. They also filed a motion for withdrawal of
the Court's opinion, so that Mr. Justice Rehnquist could consider a
separate motion addressed to him requesting recusal because of his
prior involvement in the case. The petition and motions were denied
on October 10, 1972.59
II.

THE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The issues raised by Laird v. Tatum cannot be meaningfully
examined solely in their legal context. Two other areas must be explored in some detail before an attempt can be made to analyze
Laird: use of federal troops in civil disorders; and the Army's domestic intelligence program.
A.

The Use of Federal Troops in Civil Disorders

The defendants in Laird relied on statutory authorization by
implication for their data-collection on civilian activities. They also
viewed the MI program as a necessary preparation for the commitment of Federal troops in civil disorders. It is useful to review the
history of Federal troop commitment to see if the statutory provisions
cited allow this expansive interpretation.
Americans have always been wary of military forces. The third
amendment is as much a recognition of the coercive nature of mili56. Id.
57. Id. at 26.
58. Id. at 40.
59. 93 S. Ct. 7 (1972).
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tary force in a civil setting as it is a declaration of property rights.
The debate over when and how to employ Federal forces to suppress
civil disorder dates back to the founding days of the nation.0° As
early as 1792, fears were voiced that the use of federal troops would
dampen civil liberties. "Congressman John Francis Mercer of
Virginia rose in the new House of Representatives to denounce a
bill to permit use of federal troops to control civil disorders, 'In no
free country,' he said, 'can the [military] be called forth nor martial
law proclaimed but under great restrictions.' "61
Two years after Congressman Mercer expressed his concern,
President George Washington was faced with the Whiskey Rebellion, a Pennsylvania protest against the imposition of an excise tax
many considered to be little different from the hated British Stamp
Act.62 Washington dispatched troops after writing, 8
Not only the Constitution and Laws must strictly govern; but
the employing of the regular troops avoided if it be possible to
effect order without their aid .... Yet, if no other means will
effectually answer, and the Constitution and Laws will authorise these they must be used as the Dernier resort.
Washington was quick to warn, however, that the necessary deployment of troops because of the inability of local government to
keep order did not mean that the military authorities were to govern.
"The dispensation of... justice belongs to the civil Magistrate and
let it ever be our pride and our glory to leave the sacred deposit
64
there unviolated."
Although there were occasional departures from Washington's
standard, the concept that the employment of Federal forces must
occur only when such commitment is the "Dernier resort" was
accepted by most presidents. 65
60. See generally, A. YARmouNsKy, THE MILITARY EsrABLISHIENT (1971). This
excellent study, especially chapter 11, is recommended for those desiring a more complete account of the role of the military in American society.
61. Id. at 153 (Footnote Omitted).
62. S. MoRIsoN, THE OxFoRo
HsroR OF THE AMEUCAN PEOPLE 840 (1965).
63. 32 THE WRrmNGs oF GEORGE WASHMGTON 153 (J. Fitzpatrick, ed. 1931).
64. 4 THE WmINOs oF GEORGE WASINGTON 6 (J. Fitzpatrick, ed. 1931).
65. The reluctance to commit troops is perhaps best illustrated by President Theodore Roosevelt's terse telegram to an Army commander during a bitter 1907 Nevada
miners' riot: "Do not act at all until President issues proclamation .... Better twentyfour hours of riot, damage, and disorder than illegal use of the troops." B. RICH, THE
PREsmEmS AND CrviL DISORDERS 129 (1941).

Not all Presidents have been as concerned with maintaining control over Federal
forces. President Wilson's directive that National Guard commanders should respond
to all state requests for aid-at the time the Guard was federalized-has been severely
criticized as an abdication of Federal power. Id. (1941).
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As Washington correctly foresaw, occasions arise when the only
means left to restore public order is the use of the Federal military
might. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provides the authority
for such use and three statutory provisions define the procedures for
the President to follow in dispatching the Army.06 The President
may direct the commitment of federal forces upon a request by a
state legislature, or a state governor if the legislature cannot be convened, to suppress civil disorder. Troops may be deployed by the
President to combat a rebellion against the national government.
Last, the Chief Executive may commit troops if state or national
law is interfered with so as to result in a denial of constitutional
rights to a part or a class of the state's population. 7
Nowhere in these statutory provisions nor in any other legislation
is there reference to or authority for pre-commitment activities on
the part of the military.
B.

The Army's Domestic Intelligence Program

Until former Army Captain Pyle's January 1970 article appeared,
virtually no information had ever become public suggesting that the
66. The statutes apply to the military in general, not just to the Army. In practice,
however, the Army has been almost exclusively the branch of the Armed Forces which
the President has called out for riot duty.
67. 10 U.S.C. § 331 provides:
Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against its government, the
President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the
other States, in the number requested by that State, and use such of the armed
forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the insurrection.
10 U.S.C. § 332 provides:
Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or
assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it
impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State or Territory
by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service
such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers
necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.
10 US.C. § 333 provides:
The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any
other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress,
in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United
States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a
right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and
secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail,
or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or (2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United
States or impedes the course of justice under those laws. In any situation
covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal
protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.
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Army maintained a program of surveillance and data-compilation on
civilians.68
In February 1970, Pyle and the author initiated a nationwide
investigation of MI activities.6 9 Although the Army assured critics
that it had re-evaluated its intelligence needs with regard to civil
disturbance preparation, Pyle, in a second article in July 1970, several months after the District Court hearings in Laird, charged, 0
Despite over 50 Congressional inquiries, the threat of House
and Senate hearings, and a lawsuit by the American Civil
Liberties Union, more than 1,000 plainclothes soldier-agents
continue to monitor the political activities of law-abiding
citizens.
He asserted that the Army, finding that "the rising tide of criticism
could not be ignored," 71 had issued a series of partial admissions. "In
the jargon of the spy trade, such admissions are known as 'plausible
denials,' because they are invested with just enough truth to mask
an essential falsehood."72
Although a number of senators and congressmen threatened to
hold hearings on the Army's intelligence program, only one, Senator
Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (Democrat-North Carolina), actually held hearings.
In February and March 1971, the Subcommittee on Constitutional
68. See generally J. JENsEN, TiH PRICE OF VIGILANCC (1968). This is a fascinating
study of military surveillance of civilian politics during World War I and is one of

the only works to delve into this facet of military operations. Jensen examines the
Army's fear of dissenters during the First World War and traces the steps taken by
the fledgling I Branch-then known as the Corps of Intelligence Police-to monitor
and control dissent. The Army entered into an extensive liaison relationship with the
American Protective League, a vigilante group which sought to identify and neutralize
German sympathizers and pacifists. One of the most chilling examples of MI activity
in the sensitive area of First Amendment rights occurred in Butte, Montana, in 1917,
when a military intelligence party raided a union printing plant with the aid of
civilian vigilantes and arrested labor leaders and seized pamphlets. Among the Army
raiders was then Major Omar N. Bradley. Apparently the only factor to prevent the
enlargement of the Army's largely clandestine domestic police role during World
War I was the termination of hostilities and the resultant cutback in appropriations
for the MI Branch. THE PRICE OF VIGILAN E is must reading for those interested in

fully understanding the constitutional implications of the issues raised in Laird v.
Tatum.
69. The author and Mr. Pyle began their investigation, which is still in progress,
in February 1970. In connection with this study, the author has travelled throughout
the United States, Canada, and the Virgin Islands to interview scores of former Army
agents, as well as civilians affected by the Army's program. Some sources came voluntarily forward while other were developed by Pyle and the author. Many have insisted
on total anonymity in exchange for their cooperation.
70. Pyle, CONUS Revisited: The Army Covers Up, 2 THE WASHINGTON
July 1970, at 49.

MONTHLY,

71. Id. at 50.
72. Id.
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Rights, chaired by Senator Ervin, heard witnesses on eleven hearing
days. 78 Although the Subcommittee concerned itself with several
issues, most of the hearing days were devoted to MI activities. The
2,164 pages of testimony, documentary evidence, and related materials published by the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights are,
at present, the only reference source on Army domestic spying.74 No
attempt to outline the extensive material contained in the two volumes published will be made here, but a summary of the hearings
is a prerequisite to understanding the analysis of Laird v. Tatum
which follows this section.
Hearings witnesses testified that an Army agent, in civilian
clothes, had attended black studies classes at New York University
to monitor one professor and his course material.7 5 Agents had infiltrated racial,76 campus,7 7 and religious groups78 and had gathered
data on virtually every activist group in the United States.7 9 Military
intelligence agents attended both national political conventions in
1968, according to witnesses.80 At the Chicago Democratic Convention, undercover men with bogus news credentials wandered about
with a videotape camera and conducted phony news interviews
with protest leaders to determine their future plans.8 ' At the Miami
Republican Convention, agents drifted aimlessly among the delegates
on the convention floor after having been given vague and ill-defined
orders to monitor political activity.82 One witness related that he
penetrated a church-sponsored youth group in Colorado because
"one of the founders of the organization had been active in antiwar
activities in Colorado Springs.

...
IsThis same agent had orders

to spy on local anti-poverty agencies.84
73. Hearings on FederalData Banks, Computers, and the Bill of Rights Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., pts. 1 and 2 (1971) [hereinafter I Hearingsand H Hearings respectively].
74. See STAFF or SENATE Comm. oN THE JUDICIARY, SuBcoMrM. ON CoNsrrrunToNAL
RIGHTS, ARMY SuRvEILANCE OF CrvIjANs: A DOCUmNTARY ANALYsis, 92nd Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1972). This report analyzes the Army's use of computers in connection with its
I program and is an essential appendix to the two Hearings volumes.
75. I Hearings at 290.
76. See statement and testimony of Christopher H. Pyle, I Hearings at 147. See also
the author's statement and testimony, I Hearings at 244.
77. Note 76 supra.
78. I Hearings at 305 and at 285.
79. I Hearings passim. Virtually all of the former MI personnel who testified reported
massive data-gathering.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

I Hearings at 185, at 198, and at 274.
See Pyle testimony in I Hearings at 147.
I Hearings at 274.
Id. at 806.
Id. at 308.
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A black agent recounted his assignments to cover anti-war meetings in churches and to cruise the black areas of Washington D.C.
in a radio-equipped car, reporting on community activities.15 On one
occasion this former first lieutenant had to attend a children's Halloween party because refreshment ingredients for the party had been
obtained from local stores by a known black militant.80 According
to this witness, Army intelligence interest extended to the topic of
birth control.
Agents from our unit were detailed to attend a conference of
dissenting priests from throughout the Washington Archdiocese who were protesting the position that Archbishop O'Boyle
87
had taken in reference to the birth control pill.
To store the information collected by the special agents and provided by other agencies, the Army maintained several computer data
banks as well as local intelligence files at approximately 300 Army
intelligence field and resident offices throughout the U.S. These data
banks contained information on hundreds of thousands of American
citizens, much of it obtained from informers and undercover agents.
Many of those under surveillance were either young men and women
or black Americans, a fact that will be shown to have special relevance in establishing a theory of First Amendment chill caused by
the MI program.8 8 To date, the Army has presented no evidence to
show that its data banks and local field office files concerning civilians
have been destroyed.
Many of the witnesses before the Ervin Subcommittee stated that
the Army received much of its information through liaison with
other agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The
author, while serving in MI in Washington, received hundreds of
F.B.I. reports weekly on individuals and organizations involved in
lawful dissent.8 9
The Department of the Army's principal spokesman before the
Ervin Subcommittee was Robert F. Froehlke, then Assistant Secre85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 288.
Id. at 289.
Id.
See REPoRT ON Anay SuRvELL Nc,

supra note 74; author's testimony, I Hearings

at 264-265 for a representative but very incomplete listing of the organizations monitored by MI.
89. Some reports concerned criminal activity which had no bearing on or relation.
ship to the Army. A small percentage of reports, no more than five percent in the
author's estimation, contained information relevant and necessary for the accomplish.
ment of the Army's mission.
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259

tary of Defense (Administration). 90 Froehlke acknowledged, "Clearly
there is no precedent for the scope and intensity of information collection and analysis related to the civilian communities which occurred in the period in question." 91 He described in detail the civil
disturbance picture during the period 1967-1970 and explained Army
preparations for suppressing civil disturbances.9 2 Dealing directly
with the Army's involvement in monitoring civilian affairs, Froehlke
depicted most of the Army's effort as directly related to tactical deployment of troops.9 3 He acknowledged that covert operations had
taken place with official approval, in four instances.94
Froehlke admitted that "a civil disturbance related covert collection was authorized for an agent to enroll at New York University
to monitor a special course entitled 'New Black Revolt,' in early
1968."1;
Froehlke conceded that as the pressure to obtain information by
agent observation increased, "In some cases, the rather obscure demarcation between direct agent observation and covert collection
was probably transgressed."9 6 [emphasis added]
Undersecretary Froehlke concluded his testimony by emphasizing the steps then being undertaken by the Department of the Army
to limit Army intelligence collection to the minimal amount required for mission preparedness.9 7
In the context of this background, the legal issues can now be
examined and weighed.
III. THE LEGAL IssuEs-THE SUPREME COURT AND
LAiRD v. TATUM
The plaintiffs in Lairdv. Tatum sought judicial relief for alleged
infringements of their First Amendment rights, and on behalf of
other individuals and organizations claiming the same right to engage
in lawful political activity without being surveilled by Army agents.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Mr. Froehlke is now Secretary of the Army.
I Hearings at 376.
Id. at 382-4.
id. at 282-6.

94. Id. at 287. The four acknowledged operations took place at the following
events: the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August 1968; the March

on the Pentagon in October 1967; the June 1968 Washington Spring Project (better
known as the Poor People's Campaign); and the presidential inauguration in January

1969. During these operations, agents were admittedly used to infiltrate groups in
order to obtain information on personalities and activities associated with the event.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 288.
97. Id. at 392 et seq.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol1/iss1/16

16

et al.: Laird v. Tatum: The Supreme Court and a First Amendment Challenge

Hofstra Law Review
In affirming the dismissal below, the Supreme Court has raised many
issues which will affect future First Amendment adjudication.
A.

The ChillingEffect

The rights protected by the First Amendment were recognized
in Dombrowski v. Pfister to be a public interest "of transcendant value to all society, and not merely to those exercising their
rights ...... ,"98 Any government policies or the acts of government
officials which restrain, limit, deter or control individuals in the
exercise of First Amendment rights directly conffict with the Supreme Court's finding in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan that the
First Amendment embodies "a profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust and wide-open....-99
The scope of public issues for debate is vast. Some topics are of
limited impact and interest, others are far-reaching and charged with
controversy and dissension. Throughout history, governments have
attempted by various means to suppress dissent by citizens. The First
Amendment was designed not only to allow dissent, but to protect
and encourage this fundamental right.
In Laird v. Tatum, the plaintiffs did not assert that the Army
attempted to directly prohibit protest, dissent, or speech. Rather,
they maintained that the Army's system of surveillance and datacompilation exerted an unhealthy and inhibiting effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights which deterred Americans from
enjoying those constitutional provisions. The absence of a direct
intent to prevent speech or lawful dissent does not obviate First
Amendment challenges, for as Justice Brennan stated in Lamont v.
Postmaster General, "inhibition as well as prohibition against the
exercise of precious First Amendment rights is a power denied to
100
government.
The question arising from Justice Brennan's statement is what
government activity constitutes the impermissible inhibiting of
First Amendment rights? In Watkins v. United States, the Court
found that where people are identified with views that are "unorthodox, unpopular or even hateful to the general public," there is an
injury covered by the First Amendment.' 0 '
Perhaps the greatest fear of the Lairdplaintiffs was the possibility
98. 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).

99. 276 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
100. 281 US. 201, 509 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring opinion).

101. 254 U.S. 178, 197 (1957).
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that they or their followers might be the subject of governmental
sanctions as a result of their political activity. As the Court noted in
NAACP v. Button, "The threat of sanctions may deter almost as
10 2
potently as the actual application of sanctions."
Sanctions for the exercise of First Amendment rights have been
attempted. In Dombroski v. Pfister, the threat of prosecution under
an overbroad state statute was found to chill First Amendment rights.
Justice Brennan noted that "Because of the sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression, we have not required that all those
subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test their
rights."103
Other forms of governmental sanctions besides prosecution may
also be employed. Security clearances may be denied, promotions
may not come, positions may not be offered, employment may be
terminated. To determine whether a First Amendment chill exists,
we must look beyond the possibility or probability of prosecution
and examine the complained of conduct with reference to the
claimed necessity for such activity by government and the impact
of the conduct on the complainants.
In Lamont, the Supreme Court invalidited a government scheme
which required individuals desiring to receive certain types of mail
from communist countries to affirmatively indicate such desire before
receiving the mail. The case established the proposition that government cannot demand that people act affirmatively in response to
government requests for information as a pre-condition for the enjoyment of First Amendment rights. As the lower court noted in
Heilberg v. Fixa, a companion case decided by the Supreme Court
with Lamont, the unwillingness of the individual to be identified
in the eyes-and files-of government as one interested in unorthodox concepts, groups or individuals is part of a deterrent to the
free expression of ideas.0 4 Engagement in lawful protest under the
eyes and camera lenses of government agents can be seen as an affirmative act of the type struck down in Lamont.
Recognizing that identification with a lawful, albeit controversial cause can deter freedom of expression, the court granted an
injunction forbidding state law enforcement officers from attending
and monitoring union meetings in Local 309 v. Gates.0 5 Similarly,
the Court recognized in NAACP v. Alabama that the compelled dis102. 271 US. 415, 433 (1968).
103. 980 U.S. at 486.
104. 236 F. Supp. 405, 409 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
105. 75 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ind. 1948).
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closure to government officials of membership lists can result in
significant fears on the part of the organization's members that sanctions may follow and that these fears, admittedly not always rational,
can act as a chilling deterrent on the members. 100
The Laird plaintiffs asserted that the Army's nationwide program
created a chilling effect and was so extensive in operation that it
07
could be seen as a "dragnet which may enmesh anyone."'
Responding to the charges that MI surveillance created an impermissible chill on First Amendment rights, the government advanced a narrow interpretation of Dombrowski, arguing that no legal
or criminal sanctions threatened any of the plaintiffs. 0 8 The Army's
activity, according to the government, did not require disclosure of
membership lists nor did MI operations entail the assumption of
affirmative acts by the plaintiffs in order to exercise their rights. The
government, noting that the plaintiffs acknowledged that the Army
had a lawful civil disturbance mission, urged the Court to apply a
balancing test to the situation at bar. 0 9
The lack of an evidentiary record precludes discussion of the
actual Army practices which led to the Lairdplaintiffs' chilling effect
claims in this part of the comment (see Conclusion). The government's contention that a balancing test should be employed raises
the fundamental question whether First Amendment rights may be
balanced against activities adopted in the pursuit of lawful governmental policies and practices.
The circumscription of First Amendment rights as a corollary
to executing a valid governmental function has been found constitutionally repugnant "less under the guise of regulating conduct
that is reachable by the police power, freedom of speech or of the
press suffer."' 10 The standard to be applied cannot simply be an
inquiry into the nature and extent of the lawful state police power
"but whether the means chosen to achieve a legitimate end are so
sweeping that fundamental personal liberties are stifled.""' The
balancing test was clearly rejected by the Court in United States v.
Robel where the Court declared," 2
106. 357 Us. 449 (1958).
107. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263 (1937); Appellants' Brief at 16, Tatum V.
Laird, 444 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

108. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 80, at 24.
109. Id. at 2 et seq.
110. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966).

111. Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730, 734 (5th Cir. 1968).
112. 389 U.S. 258, 268, n.20 (1967).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1973

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 16

Comments
Faced with a clear conflict between a federal statute enacted
in the interests of national security and an individual's exercise of his First Amendment rights, we have confined our
analysis to whether Congress has adopted a constitutional
means in achieving its concededly legitimate legislative goal.
... [W]e have in no way "balanced" those respective interests.
We have ruled only that the Constitution requires that the
conflict between Congressional power and individual rights
be accommodated by legislation drawn more narrowly to
avoid the conflict.
In attempting to create a concept of balancing interests in Laird
v. Tatum, the defendants sought to rely not on statutory enactments
which clearly contain neither reference to nor mandate for the MI
domestic program, but on directives of Department of Defense and
Department of the Army officials interpreting their scope of authority under the statutes."3
In Laird, we do not find a clear conflict between statutes and
First Amendment rights. There is, however, a sharp and clear conflict
between Department of the Army directives, the claimed authority
for which is statutory, and the individual's First Amendment rights.
B. Justiciability,Separation of Powers and
the Standing Question
The value of the First Amendment to the American concept of
society and government has resulted in the creation of a standard
for justiciability in First Amendment cases which is less restricted
113. 10 U.S.C. §§331-333 (1970). See I Hearings 375 et seq., testimony of Under Secretary of Defense Froehlke. 1I Hearings contains numerous Department of the Army
directives concerning the collection of information about civilian organizations and
personalities by MIs.It is interesting to note that the Army civil disturbance plans
cite no authority in law. The author, based on his experience, believes that the challenged Army program arose largely because military officers, inadequately and insufficiently supervised by civilian superiors, consistently and disastrously misinterpreted the
source and nature of urban strife and rioting. It appeared to the author that many
of these high-ranking officers were convinced that urban rioting was initiated because
of conspiratorial activity on the part of a number of protest groups and their leaders.
Insulated from frequent and meaningful contact with civilian communities, many of
the Army's top-ranking generals were unable to grasp and comprehend the complex
political, socio-economical and historical background which contributed to the outbreak of tragic violence in American cities. The legal arguments advanced by the
government at various stages of Laird as authority for the Ml program were, in the
opinion of the author, afterthoughts brought on by the need to litigate the questions
raised. In 16 months of Pentagon duty, the author never heard any high-ranking
officer or civilian superior enunciate, much less question, the existence of a legal
authority for the Army's program of surveillance and data-compilation.
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than one employed in cases not involving basic rights.1 14 In Reed
15 the Court found,""'
Enterprisesv. Corcoran,1
Where the plaintiff complains of chills and threats in the
protected First Amendment area, a court is more disposed to
find that he is presenting a real and not an abstract controversy.
With reference to the relationship between sanctions and justiciability, the Court in Wolff v. Selective Service Local Board No. 16
noted:117
It has been held repeatedly that the mere threat of the imposition of unconstitutional sanctions will cause immediate and
irreparable injury to the free exercise of rights as fragile and
sensitive to suppression as the freedoms of speech and assembly ... Since it is the mere threat of unconstitutional sanctions which precipitates the injury, the courts must intervene
at once to vindicate the threatened liberties.
The Army's activity in itself may be a sanction against the exercise of First Amendment rights. The acknowledgement in Heilberg
v. Fixa, that identification with unorthodox views by government
can act as a deterent to lawful political participation makes obvious
the concept that sanctions are not limited, as they were in Dombrowski, to possible or probable formal prosecutions. The very surveillance itself, especially at private meetings, is a form of forced
disclosure of membership. It identifies persons at meetings whether
or not they hold the unorthodox viewpoint espoused by a particular
faction. Even if they do agree with the views of the speaker or organization there is clearly no right to compel such identification.
A determination of justiciability cannot await a finding that the
challenged program is actually succeeding through design or chance
in deterring lawful activity. Referring to the situation challenged in
Dombrowski, the Court stated, "The chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights may derive from the fact of its prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its success or failure." 118 If
the view is accepted that a program of surveillance can, in some
circumstances, be interpreted as a prosecution of a non-judicial
114.
115.
116.
117.

National Students Association v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
354 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Id. at 523.
372 F.2d 817, 824 (2nd Cir. 1967).

118. 380 US. at 487.
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nature, justiciability exists without a statement that the challenged
activity has achieved its chilling effect.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Laird majority, found that
"it is not the role of the judiciary, absent actual present or immediate
threatened injury resulting from unlawful governmental action" to
investigate an activity initiated and directed by the Executive
Branch."x9 Departing from precedent in First Amendment cases, he
20
denied justiciability, stating that:'
[W]hen presented with claims of judicially cognizable injury
resulting from military intrusion into the civilian sector, federal courts are fully empowered to consider claims of those
asserting such injury; there is nothing in our Nation's history
or in this Court's decided cases, including our holding today,
that can properly be seen as giving any indication that actual
or threatened injury by reason of unlawful activities of the
military would go unnoticed or unremedied.
The court improperly denied the plaintiffs the opportunity to
prove their case because the majority refused to acknowledge that
the plaintiffs, in their original complaint, had alleged actual First
Amendment injury to themselves and, further, had alleged that the
Army had conducted covert operations; they had been unable to
substantiate these charges without witnesses. That no evidence
existed in the trial court record to indicate covert infiltration of
private events is attributable solely to the refusal of Judge Hart
to permit witnesses to be heard in the District Court.
Plaintiffs maintained, in their brief before the Supreme Court,
as did the amici in their brief, that evidence could and would be
introduced at a trial court hearing to show both the nature of the
chilling effect upon the plaintiffs and the extent of MI clandestine
operations. The majority, while making no reference to these allegations, took note of material fied by the Solicitor General which included Army and Defense Department directives relating to MI
activities and commented,121
[T]hese directives indicate that the Army's review of the needs
of its domestic intelligence activities has indeed been a continuing one and that those activities have since been significantly reduced.
119. 408 U.S. at 15.
120. Id.
121. Id at 8.
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In fact, the degree of MI reduction in surveillance and data-compilation was highly contested by the plaintiffs in their brief and by the
knowledgeable amici. The Court's reliance on the government direc-

tives did not, in any event, adjudicate the legality of the challenged
program. Even if the practices of MI had been curtailed or halted, 122

[T]he voluntary abandonment of a practice does not relieve
a court of adjudicating its legality, particularly where the
practice is deeply rooted and long standing. For if the case

were dismissed as moot appellants would be "free to return
to... [their] old ways."
The Army practices, while largely expanded in the 1967-70
period, began in 1917. The author personally had access to a vast
number of reports on civilians from the 1940s and 1950s. The activity
was deeply rooted; only the subjects which interested MI seemed
to change, i.e., left wing organizations in the 1950s, new left, black
and youth groups in the 1960s.
The Court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing. To do this,
the majority seized on a statement by plaintiffs' counsel during oral
argument before Judge Hart. 23 Counsel had stated that the plaintiffs
were not cowed or chilled, but rather represented those Americans
who would not and could not put themselves under public scrutiny
and feared MI surveillance. Obviously, the Laird plaintiffs were not
so immobilized as to be unable to initiate a suit. In view of their
pre-hearing assertion that they had been affected and inhibited by the
Army's program, it is difficult to understand the Court majority's
interpretation of and reliance on one statement. The Court used
one oral statement to negate all of plaintiffs' claims of First Amendment injury, ignoring all of plaintiffs' other assertions.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Laird plaintiffs, or other activists bringing a future suit based on a chilling effect claim related
to government activities, are actually not themselves chilled, the
Court's decision may significantly narrow the protection of First
Amendment freedoms as a practical reality.
If activists cannot raise the question of the chilling effect unless
they are personally cowed-and leaders are sometimes less vulnerable
than average citizens-and such actions can be brought only by the
personally chilled, can we expect many challenges to First Amendment inhibiting practices? As the brief amici pointed out to the
122. Gray v. Sanders, 872 U.S. 868, 876 (1963).
128. See Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947, at 959 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where a portion of
the transcript from the District Court hearing is reproduced.
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Court, by requiring that litigants be either intimidated or demonstrate having been harmed in addition to intimidation, "the Government would place all dissenters in the classic 'Catch 22' dilemma:
they can invoke their rights if they are immobilized by fear, but if
they really were immobilized by fear, they would not invoke their
24
rights."
The reality, of course, is that political activism cannot exist without followers as well as leaders, and if average Americans are deterred
from exercising their First Amendment rights, those rights cease to
be a public interest "of transcendent value to all society."' 25 As Mr.
Justice Brennan noted in Lamont, "It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers."' 2 6 The Supreme
Court's ruling in Lairdmay lay the foundation stone for that marketplace.
C.

The Role of Mr. Justice Rehnquist

Before appointment to the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Rehnquist was an Assistant Attorney General in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel. 2 7 In that capacity, he appeared on
March 9, 1971 and March 17, 1971 at the Ervin Hearings to explain
the Justice Department's role in MI surveillance of lawful political
activity' 28 During the hearings, he testified at length about the legality of military intelligence operations and directly presented his
viewpoint on Lairdv. Tatum. At one point, in response to a question
from Senator Ervin, he stated:' 2 9
My only point of disagreement with you is to say whether
as in the case of Tatum v. Laird that has been pending in the
Court of Appeals here in the District of Columbia that an
action will lie by private citizens to enjoin the gathering of
124. Brief for Tatum, et al., as Amici Curiae, supra note 37, at 11. The "Catch 22"
reference is to Joseph Heller's novel of the same name. In Heller's novel, an Army
Air Force bombardier during World War II requested relief from combat duty because he thought everyone was planning to kill him. The only way out of flying for the
bombardier was Catch 22
which specified that a concern for one's safety in the face of dangers that were
real and immediate was the process of a rational mind ...All he had to do was
ask; (to be relieved from flying) and as soon as he did, he would no longer be crazy
and would have to fly more missions.
125. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
126. 381 U.. at 808.
127. Respondents' Motion to Recuse Mr. Justice Rehnquist Nunc Pro Tune at 4,
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
128. See I Hearings at 597-654 and at 849-914.
129. Id. at 864.
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information by the executive branch where there has been
no threat of compulsory process and no pending action against
any of those individuals on the part of the government.
Rehnquist's statement then is similar to the conclusion later reached
by the Court majority in Laird and is based on the same theory of
standing and chilling effect doctrine.1 80
The plaintiffs, in their motion to recuse Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
cited Canons 2 and 3 of the Final Draft of the Code of Judicial Conduct.' 81 They relied also on lower federal court decisions recusing
other judges "under circumstances similar to those of Mr. Justice
18 2
Rehnquist in the case at bar."'
Had Justice Rehnquist abstained from voting, the Court of
Appeals decision would have been affirmed by the vote of an equally
divided court. By casting the decisive vote, Mr. Justice Rehnquist
prevented the activists from obtaining the evidentiary hearing they
sought and upheld his seemingly preconceived position regarding
the merits of the case.
Justice Rehnquist, on October 10, 1972, in an unprecedented
action, issued a 16 page memorandum in which he denied the motion
for recusal and explained his position.188 Acknowledging that he had
appeared as an expert witness during the Hearings,8 4 he denied
having any involvement in the Laird litigation while serving in the
Department of Justice. 85 The Associate Justice maintained that he
130. 408 U.S. at 1-16.
131. Canon 2. A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities.
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct
himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Canon 3.A judge should perform the duties of his office impartially and
diligently.
C. Disqualification.
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned including but not
limited to instances where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the pro.
ceeding;
(b) he served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such
association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such
lawyer has been a material witness concerning it.
132. Respondents' Motion for Recusal, supra note 127, at 10.
133. Memorandum of Mr. Justice Rehnquist (October 10, 1972), Laird v. Tatum,
93 S. Ct. 7 (1972).
134. Id. at 8-9.
135. Id. at 10.
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had been informed of the case as background preparation for his testimony as a Department of Justice representative at the Hearings.'3 6
In his memorandum, Mr. Justice Rehnquist admitted supervising the preparation of a memorandum of law on Laird v. Tatum
in response to a request from Senator Hruska, a member of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. 8 7 Although no copy of the
memorandum for Hruska is apparently available, Justice Rehnquist
admitted that he "would expect such a memorandum to have
commented on the decision of the Court of Appeals in Laird v.
Tatum .

"...138

He stated, however, that he would never participate, as an Associate Justice, in a case in which he had signed a pleading or brief or
actively participated prior to being appointed to the Supreme
Court.139 Thus he found no grounds for mandatory recusal.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist proceeded to examine the question of discretionary recusal. 140 Discretionary recusal is indicated where a
judge had a previous relationship with a party to a litigation to such
a degree that impropriety would be suggested by the judge's failure
to recuse himself.141 He found, however, that he had
no hesitation in concluding that my total lack of connection
while in the Department of Justice with the defense of the
case of Laird v. Tatum does not suggest discretionary disqualification here because of my previous relationship with the
Justice Department. 42 [emphasis added]
The Associate Justice also stated that "none of the former Justices
of this Court since 1911 have followed a practice of disqualifying
themselves in cases involving points of law with respect to which
they had expressed an opinion or formulated policy prior to ascending to the bench."'143
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that "fair minded judges might
disagree about the matter,"' 44 which he admitted was a "fairly debatable one.' 1415 The Justice urged as a countervailing argument
186. Id. at 9-10.
137. Id. at 10.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 11.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 14.
145. Id.
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that, when not disqualified, judges have a duty to sit which is equally
1 46
strong to the duty to recuse when indicated.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist's final argument for participating is in147
triguing.
The prospect of affirmance by an equally divided Court, unsatisfactory enough in a single case, presents even more serious problems where companion cases reaching opposite results
are heard together here. [emphasis added]
The Associate Justice noted that "the disqualification of one Justice
of this Court raises the possibility of an affirmance of the judgment
below by an equally divided court."'148 He then found that "the consequence attending such a result is, of course, that the principle of
law presented by the case is unsettled."' 49
The Associate Justice failed to realize that affirmance by an
equally divided Court in Laird v. Tatum would merely insure that
the plaintiffs obtained an opportunity to present evidence and make
a record upon which the Supreme Court could, at a later date, concretely base a substantive review. Further, there were no companion
cases to Laird v. Tatum before the Court. Mr. Justice Rehnquist
must have been aware of the enormous quantity of material unearthed during the Hearings, at which he himself testified, which
strongly indicated that the Laird litigants could present evidence
dealing with the issues raised by both the Supreme Court majority
and the Court of Appeals dissent. Rather than settle a point of law,
Mr. Justice Rehnquist's participation insured the continuance of a
state of confusion.
It is also difficult to accept the analogies constructed by Mr. Justice Rehnquist to liken his participation to that by previous Justices.
Justice Rehnquist was correct in stating in his memorandum that
Chief Justice Hughes and Mr. Justice Frankfurter had both been
involved in writing books, encouraging the enactment of legislation,
and commenting on matters of legal controversy before coming to
the Supreme Court.10 Neither, however, had participated in a case
as politically charged as Laird v. Tatum, and on behalf of the Executive Branch so soon before being appointed to the Court, as Justice
Rehnquist did.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
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Such problems as may follow an affirmance by an equally divided
Court are of little import compared with the serious ethical dilemma
Mr. Justice Rehnquist's participation in Laird v. Tatum has posed
for himself, the Court and the Constitution.
IV.

CONCLUSION

An examination of the Ervin Hearings provides ample data upon
which an analysis of the Army's activities can be made. The record
reveals not an attempt by the Army to ignore or supplant civil and
constitutional authority, but rather a program that can be characterized as at once coordinated and out of control, supervised and
running free, benevolent and malign.
In July 1967, racial violence broke out in Detroit, Michigan,
with such intensity that federal military assistance was urgently required to restore order with a minimum of bloodshed. Simultaneous outbreaks occurred, with varying degrees of intensity, in a
number of cities. The Army was not prepared; it had little or no
relevant tactical intelligence. So little information was available that
the author, on duty in the Pentagon's Army Operations Center, received a frantic call for information from an Army staff officer in
Detroit who stated that Lieutenant General Throckmorton, the
Army commander on the scene, was positioning his airborne troops
with the aid of an oil company road map.
Faced with the possibility of further outbreaks of violence at a
time when troop strength in the United States was low because of
the Vietnam war, the civilian and top military officers ordered MI
to prepare for future civil disturbances and, if possible, predict further outbreaks. Very little guidance was given the General Staff MI
analysts or the special agents in the field as to what preparation was
necessary or what information was relevant and desired.' 51
In the two-and-one-half years between the Detroit riots and the
first Pyle article, MI engaged increasingly in a widespread system of
domestic surveillance and data-accumulation, largely without the
knowledge and approval of civilian superiors. 52
The United States Army Intelligence Command, the component
151. The author, for example, was ordered by a superior officer to assume his duties
with the simple command, "From now on, you're Mr. New Left in the Pentagon.
Start a desk."
152. The failure of the appointed civilian superiors in the Department of Defense
and the Department of the Army to discover that the Army, and MI in particular, was
running a nationwide surveillance operation has, of course, serious constitutional
implications in itself with which this comment cannot deal.
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responsible for most of the MI agents in the country,' 3 issued increasingly ambitious and far-flung collection requirements.'" 4 Before
the end of 1967, an initial concern with racial violence had led to requirements that special agents monitor virtually every form of dissent in the United States.
As direct agent coverage increased, other agencies, especially the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, responded to Army requests for information by sending extensive classified reports reflecting information collected from covert and other sources on the politics of dissent.
To maintain this data, several computerized data banks were
established. The largest and the most complete was at the United
States Army Investigative Records Repository at Fort Holabird,
Maryland.
A phenomenon known as bureaucratic accretion and the application of military institutional paradigms, a not surprising development, assured that the data banks would grow immensely. The
majority of participants in the MI program saw their activities as
being in the best interests of the American people, rather than as
creating a threat to liberty. Of particular relevance is the warning
by Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States:16
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasions of their
liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
Such men largely directed and carried out the Army's program. In
a disquieting minority of instances, individuals of relatively low
rank undertook operations which, when made public, astounded and
embarrassed their superiors.5 8
153. A small number of agents assigned to combat units came under the command
of the Continental Army Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia. Most MI special agents
were assigned to the U.S. Army Intelligence Command, Fort Holabird, Maryland.
These agents, working out of field and resident offices throughout the country, were
primarily involved in conducting routine background checks-known as Personnel
Security Investigations--on individuals entering the Armed Forces and the Army in
particular. This activity was not challenged by the plaintiffs in Laird v. Tatum.
154. See II Hearings passim for a sampling of these mission requirements. See also
testimony of former special agents and other Army personnel in I Hearings.
155. 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928).
156. See the testimony of former Army Staff Sergeant John M. O'Brien in I Hearings
at 100 et seq. O'Brien's revelation that he had been directed to monitor the activities
of elected officials in the Chicago area, including U.S. Senator Adlai E. Stevenson I,
shocked the entire nation and led to a court challenge to MI practices in the Chicago
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A large part of the MI effort involved monitoring youth and
campus groups. Information from a number of agencies was regularly transmitted to the Army with reference to youth involvement
in antiwar and campus activities. The Army is predominantly composed of young men and women. It is naive to deny the very considerable chilling effect which this Army activity exerts on a wide
range of America's young men and women who might one day serve
in the Army. Anonymity is a vital component of the right to protest
for many. 15 7 Stripped of this anonymity by an intelligence system
which recorded, but never deleted, many Americans would undoubtedly consider themselves to be identified with unorthodox viewpoints by government. Participation would diminish from the
resultant chill of First Amendment rights. Had an evidentiary hearing been granted in Laird v. Tatum, the plaintiffs' allegations of
chilling effect might well have been substantiated using this vast
group alone.
The Army's activities exerted a chill on other groups too. One
of the most informative experiences ever encountered by the author
occurred in 1970, in Detroit, during the taping of an interview
show. The host was a leading black militant, the audience represented diverse segments of black Detroit and the topic was MI surveillance. When questions were solicited from the audience, the first
question, to the author's temporary confusion, was "Does the Army
have a King Alfred plan?" The audience became visibly uneasy and
distressed. The host explained that the "King Alfred plan" was the
creation of black novelist John Williams in his work, The Man Who
Cried I Am. The fictional plan was a government operation for the
area. The action, ACLU v. Laird, 463 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1972) was brought by a
number of political activists allegedly under surveillance by MI personnel in Illinois.
The action was dismissed by the District Court after an evidentiary hearing in which
much material was brought to public attention. The seriousness of the hearing was

tempered somewhat when a career MI civilian intelligence officer, responding to
O'Brien's charge that AI had harassed civilians by dispatching unordered pizza pie
to the homes of political activists, firmly asserted that he and the members of his
unit had ordered fried chicken instead for the activists. The dismissal was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit with Laird v. Tatum being cited as
controlling. The Supreme Court denied certiorari, 41 US.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1978).
157. See Address by Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., March 2, 1970, in Appendix to Ap-

peliants' Brief at 68-69, Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947. See A.

WESTN,

PRIvACY AND

(1967), the seminal work on the role of and need for privacy and individual
autonomy in our society. See also A. MmUR, Tim ASSAULT ON PRVACY (1971), an
excellent study of the threat to privacy posed by technological advances. Police surveillance is an increasing problem as police departments expand their capacity for intelligence operations of a type formerly conducted only by federal agencies in internal
security matters. A study of the First Amendment problems inherent in such activities
is well covered in F. Askin, Police Dossiers and Emerging Principles of First Amendment Adjudication, 22 STAN. L. Rzv. 196 (1970).
FREEDOat
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annihilation of black Americans in a manner reminiscent of Hitler's
genocidal schemes. Despite assurances by the author that no such
plan existed, the audience's fear, irrational yet profoundly disturbing, demonstrated the effect a government program of surveillance
can have on a minority group. Without an evidentiary hearing, the
Supreme Court, of course, had no inkling that such a response to
MI activities may be felt by a wide range of Americans.
It cannot be gainsaid, however, that the Army must have some
pre-commitment information to avoid repetitions of the oil com8
pany road map fiasco in Detroit. According to Senator Ervin,5
The business of the Army... is to know about the condition
of highways, bridges, and facilities. It is not to predict trends
and reactions by keeping track of the thoughts and actions of
Americans exercising First Amendment freedoms ....
Regardless of the imagined military objective, the chief casualty
of this overkill is the Constitution of the United States, which
every military officer and every appointed official has taken an
oath to defend.
In Powell v. McCormack, the Court affirmed that in our country
living under a written constitution, no branch or department
of the government is supreme; and it is the province and duty
of the judicial department to determine in cases regularly
brought before them, whether the powers of any branch of
the government... have been exercised in conformity of the
Constitution.15"
The Supreme Court failed to live up to that standard in Laird v.
Tatum by refusing to allow American citizens the opportunity to
prove that the Army was not exercising its powers in conformity
with the Constitution. There may not be a second chance to try this
issue. All the former Army personnel who revealed information
about the MI program were citizen-soldiers serving one tour of duty
in wartime. Career professionals did not step forward as is understandable. With the end of the Vietnam war and the transition to a
volunteer Army, it is likely that a future MI surveillance program
could operate to the possible detriment of millions of Americans
with little information, especially of a probative nature, reaching
the American public.
Already, other actions are being dismissed based on the Supreme
158. Appellants' Brief, supra note 59, at 68-69.
159. 395 U.S. 486, at 506 (1969).
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Court's decision in Laird v. Tatum. 6 0° Mr. Justice Douglas, whose
opinions ring true with a love for First Amendment freedoms, said
in his dissent in Laird v. Tatum:""'
This case is a cancer in our body politic. It is a measure of the
disease which afflicts us. Army surveillance, like Army regimentation, is at war with the principles of the First Amendment. Those who already walk submissively will say there is
no cause for alarm. But submissiveness is not our heritage....
The Bill of Rights was designed to keep agents of government
and official eavesdroppers away from assemblies of people....
There can be no influence more paralyzing of that objective
than Army surveillance. When an intelligence officer looks
over every nonconformist's shoulder in the library or walks
invisibly by his side in a picket line or infiltrates his club, the
America once extolled as the voice of liberty around the world
no longer is cast in the image which Jefferson and Madison
designed....
160. See e.g., Donohoe v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972), a challenge to police

coverage of protest meetings, which was dismissed on August 1, 1972. In Donohoe, 42
individual plaintiffs sought to represent those made timorous by the presence of police
observers who photographed individual participants. The court majority, citing Laird
v. Tatum, found that the plaintiffs had failed to show a chilling effect injury to themselves as a result of defendant's activities, and therefore they would not be permitted

to represent those who were allegedly so affected.
161. 408 US. at 28.
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